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Since the 1970s, U.S. federal courts have issued court orders condemning state prison crowding. However,
the impact of these court orders on prison spending and prison conditions is theoretically ambiguous
because it is unclear if these court orders are enforceable. We examine states' responses to court interventions
and show that these interventions generate higher per inmate incarceration costs, lower inmate mortality
rates, and a reduction in prisoners per capita. If states seek to minimize the cost of crime through deterrence,
an increase in prison costs should lead states to shift resources from corrections to other means of deterring
crime such as welfare and education spending.
However, we  find that court interventions, that are associated with higher corrections expenditures,
lead to lower welfare expenditures. This suggests that the burden of increased correctional spending
is borne by the poor. Furthermore, states do not increase welfare spending after their release from
court order; making the reduction in welfare spending permanent. Thus, our results suggest that states
do not respond to prison reform in the manner prescribed by the deterrence model. States' responses
to prison reform are most consistent with the predictions in the empirical public finance literature that
indicate stickiness in expenditure categories and that increases in spending in programs that affect
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The United States federal courts have ordered state o±cials to improve various di-
mensions of the operations of schools, prisons, and mental hospitals. However, the
enforceability of these court orders is limited by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S.
constitution which provides states with immunity in federal court.1 To get around
the Eleventh Amendment, federal cases name speci¯c state o±cials as defendants,
rather than the state, but it is di±cult to enforce court orders that require additional
spending against state o±cials since most state constitutions forbid disbursements
from the state treasury except by legislative appropriation (Hirschhorn, 1984). If
the state government is reluctant to appropriate the necessary funds to improve the
quality of the services provided by an institution (such as schools or prisons) the
federal court can respond by closing the institution, but judges may be unwilling to
take such drastic measures. Furthermore, orders to close institutions may be reversed
on appeal (Hirschhorn, 1984). Thus, it is unclear theoretically whether federal court
orders requiring additional state expenditures are enforceable.
The empirical evidence on the issue is ambiguous. For example, federal court
orders that aim to improve prison conditions have received signi¯cant attention, but
the extent to which these court orders increase correctional expenditures is disputed
(Harriman and Straussman, 1983; Taggart, 1989; and Fliter, 1996), although Levitt
(1996) shows that these court orders reduce prison population growth. Even if such
federal court orders were fully enforceable, their impact on the provision of the services
targeted by the court order as well as on other services provided by the states would
depend on how the states choose to ¯nance the additional expenditures that would
1The Eleventh Amendment states that \The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
2emerge as a consequence of the court order.
A number of researchers have examined the federal court orders from a normative
perspective. For example, federal court orders to reform schools, prisons, and mental
institutions have been criticized as undemocratic (Sandler and Schoenbrod, 2004).
Others have pointed out that the state political process gives little weight to the
disadvantaged. For instance, prisoners' rights are less likely to be protected by the
states since inmates are not allowed to vote. Thus, it has been argued that federal
courts should be given authority over expenditures for the disadvantaged to balance
out the fact that the disadvantaged have little in°uence in the state political process
(Rose-Ackerman, 2003).
Although the intended consequence of federal court interventions is to enforce
the constitutional and statutory rights of disadvantaged groups, it is possible that
an unintended consequence is the decline in funds allocated to other disadvantaged
groups as a consequence of the additional expenditures that have to be incurred by
the states to comply with these court orders. A related example is the case of the U.S.
Congress which can force states to spend more on groups of individuals by making it a
condition to continue receiving federal grants (Rosenthal, 1987). Baicker (2001) ¯nds
that federally-mandated increases in medicaid spending lead to increases in medicaid
spending at the expense of other state welfare spending. Similarly, Baicker and Gor-
don (2006) examine state Supreme Courts orders to equalize spending across school
districts. They ¯nd that these orders increase state aid to localities for education at
the expense of aid for public welfare, health, hospitals, and general services. Thus, if
federal court orders are enforceable, it is plausible that the resources used to satisfy
the court order come from other disadvantaged groups.
In this paper, we examine the impact of federal court orders to improve prison
conditions. Speci¯cally, we investigate whether federal court orders did indeed im-
3prove prison conditions, whether they impacted state expenditures on corrections,
and if and how states re-allocated resources in reaction to these court orders.
Since 1970, federal court interventions have a®ected such dimensions of prison op-
erations as sta±ng, the amount of space per inmate, medical and mental health care,
food, hygiene, sanitation, disciplinary procedures, conditions in disciplinary segrega-
tion, exercise, ¯re safety, inmate classi¯cation, grievance policies, race discrimination,
sex discrimination, religious discrimination and accommodations, and disability dis-
crimination and accommodations (Schlanger, 2006). In 1995, state attorneys general
successfully lobbied Congress to pass the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) so
that they could regain control over prisons (Wharton, 1996). The PLRA ended fed-
eral court supervision over several state correctional systems and made any further
court intervention more di±cult (Schlanger, 2006). Sullivan (2000) reports the de-
terioration of Tennessee prisons after their release from federal court supervision.2
Nonetheless, federal courts still order states to increase state correctional expendi-
tures. For instance, a panel of federal judges just ordered the California prison system
to drastically increase prison expenditures or reduce its inmate population by 150,000
within two years (Moore, 2009).
We ¯nd that following federal court orders, prison conditions improved, prison
costs per inmate increased, and per capita spending on welfare decreased. Thus, our
results suggest that federal court can increase state expenditures but that it is likely
that the resources used to ¯nance these additional expenditures come from other dis-
advantaged groups. Our results follow from a di®erence-in-di®erences methodology.
Thus, our results denote changes relative to a comparison group of states. For in-
stance, welfare expenditures may have increased following a court order but not as
2Speci¯cally, Wharton (1996) underlines the decrease in the correctional sta® and increase in
the number of violations of regulations governing mental health, ¯re safety, occupational safety, and
hazardous materials.
4much as welfare expenditures in the control group of states.
Federal court orders to improve prison conditions are expected to reduce the de-
terrent e®ect of imprisonment,3 and a large literature suggests that outlays on social
welfare and education are substitutes for corrections in combating crime.4 Thus, if
states seek to deter crime, we expect an increase in state spending on social welfare
and/or education following federal court intervention.
Contrary to our expectation we ¯nd the court orders, which are associated with an
increase in correctional spending, did not alter education spending, but generated a
decrease in welfare spending. We provide two related explanations for these ¯ndings.
First, it is possible that spending in various budget categories is \sticky." Following
a court order to improve prison conditions, per capita corrections expenditures go
up despite the decline in inmates per capita. If states experience higher crimes rates
following a short-run reduction in the prison population, it may be infeasible to
maintain a lower imprisonment rate. In general it may be di±cult for the state
to change the long-run level of the imprisonment rate given that it is a®ected by
the decision of so many independent parties (state legislature, police, prosecutors,
judge, juries, parole boards, and probation o±cers). If expenditures on corrections
are \sticky," corrections expenditures will remain at a higher level even after the state
has had enough time to adjust. Thus, given the budget constraints faced by the state,
3This is because, we ¯nd evidence in this paper that court intervention reduces prison deaths,
and Katz et al. (2003) show that a reduction in prison death rates leads to higher crime rates. Thus,
an improvement in prison conditions through court intervention implies a reduction in deterrence.
Furthermore, we document in this paper that court orders reduce per capita prisoners in the state.
Levitt (1996) shows that court orders impact the growth of prison population, which in turn in°u-
ences the crime rate. Thus, the reduction in prison population due to court intervention is another
avenue through which the court interventions may have reduced deterrence.
4For instance, Donohue and Siegelman (1998) argue for the e®ectiveness of preschool and early
childhood education, family-based therapy, and job training as a crime control device. Corman and
Mocan (2000, 2005), Mocan and Bali (forthcoming), Gould et al. (2002) and Lin (2008) provide
evidence that local unemployment, wages and poverty have an impact on criminal activity, implying
that education and training help combat crime. Lochner and Morettti (2004) demonstrate the
impact of education on criminal activity.
5a permanent increase in corrections expenditures would have a negative impact on
the provision of all services, including welfare services. Second, policy makers may
consider expenditures on various programs that a®ect the poor as substitutes. Given
that court orders increase the cost of punishing criminals, to the extent that policy
makers perceive criminals as being members of low-income groups, they may decide
to decrease in welfare payments, rather than to reduce other spending items, such as
transportation.5
Section 2 discusses prison litigation. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4
explains our empirical methodology and Section 5 presents the results.
2 Prison litigation
2.1 Background and prior research
Prior to the 1960s federal and state courts almost invariably refused to hear cases
regarding prison conditions (Bleich 1989; Schlanger 1999). In 1963, the Supreme
Court held that inmates could employ the writ of habeas corpus to contest their
conditions of incarceration.6 During the mid to late 1960s, courts intervened on
narrow issues. For instance, the courts prohibited guards from using two torture
devices on prisoners (the crank telephone and the teeter board) and \the application
of any whipping to the bare skin of prisoners."7 In the 1970s, the federal courts
took a much more activist stand. The prison systems in several states were ruled
5Baicker (2001) ¯nds that federally-mandated increases in medicaid spending lead to increases in
medicaid spending at the expense of other state welfare spending. Further, she ¯nds the e®ect to be
larger with greater racial di®erences. Similarly, Baicker and Gordon (2006) examines state Supreme
Courts orders to equalize spending across school districts. They ¯nd that these orders increase state
aid to localities for education at the expense of aid for public welfare, health, hospitals, and general
services. Court order to spend additional resources on prisons have occurred in some of the states
with the greatest racial di®erences. Thus, if federal court orders are enforceable, it is plausible that
the resources used to satisfy the court order come from other disadvantaged groups.
6Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
7Jackson v. Bishop, E.D. Ark., 268 F. Supp. 804 (1967).
6unconstitutional, and the courts enacted sweeping remedies based on the totality of
prison conditions. Federal court intervention narrowed in scope in the 1980s. As
described by Fliter (1996) and Schlanger (2006), this could be because the lawsuits in
the 1970s made states more aware of legal liabilities, and many states created dispute
resolution mechanisms to address grievances; and it could also be due the appointment
of conservative judges to the federal bench by Republican administrations (Schlanger,
2006; Epstein et al., 2007). Finally, in 1995 Congress passed the Prison Litigation
Reform Act which made existing court orders harder to sustain and new ones harder
to obtain (Schlanger, 2006).
Three previous studies have examined the impact of court orders on prison con-
ditions. Harriman and Straussman (1983), Taggart (1989) and Fliter (1996) provide
contradictory evidence on whether court orders have in°uenced state spending on
correctional facilities. These studies limited their analyzes to total corrections expen-
ditures and thus did not examine the impact of federal intervention on the number
of state prisoners, corrections expenditures per prisoner, or corrections expenditures
per capita. Further, these earlier studies did not employ panel data, and instead
examined corrections expenditures one state at the time, for the states in which the
federal courts intervened. Thus, the observed increase in corrections expenditures in
the litigated states may have been caused by overall national trends in corrections ex-
penditures. In contrast, Levitt (1996) examined a panel of all states for the years 1972
through 1993 and court orders that span the years 1971 through 1992. He reported
that prison litigation had a short-run e®ect on the growth rate of prison population.8
8Our paper is also related to Murray, Evans and Schwab (1998), who analyze the impact of state
education-¯nance reforms ordered by state courts on within-state inequality in education spending.
73 Data
Following Levitt (1996), we consider a state under court order if all correctional
facilities of the state came under court order. These \Litigated States" and the
date in which the state's correctional system came under court order, and the date
of release are displayed in Table 1. We used the information at the Civil Rights
Litigation Clearinghouse to reconcile the small discrepancies in year and litigated
status among the prior studies (Taggart, 1989; Fliter, 1996; Levitt, 1996).9
We investigate the impact of court orders on prison spending, prison mortality,
welfare expenditures, education expenditures, transportation expenditures, state and
local police expenditures as well as local jail expenditures. We de¯ne welfare ex-
penditures as all state expenditures on cash assistance to individuals, and other wel-
fare payments. Cash assistance to individuals includes AFDC/TANF and assistance
programs not under federal categorical programs (e.g., general assistance, refugee
assistance, home relief, and emergency relief). Other welfare payments include the
administration of medical and cash assistance, general relief, vendor, nursing homes
and welfare institutions owned and operated by a government, and other welfare pro-
grams. With one exception, all welfare data are obtained from the Bureau of the
Census. The measure for vendor payments from the Bureau of the Census does not
include payments to public hospitals. For this reason, vendor payments data are
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Because we are interested in the e®ect of court intervention on the yearly cost
of incarceration, we examine corrections operating expenditures.10 We also analyze
9http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu. The correct data for when the state Alabama was released
from court order is obtained from \U.S. Relinquishes Alabama Prisons; Dismissing 17-Year Lawsuit,"
New York Times, January 15, 1989, p. 17.
10In 1992, more than three-quarters of the operating expenditures went to labor compensation
(salaries, wages, and bene¯ts), while the rest was devoted to the purchase of supplies, contract
services, and the like. (Alexis M. Herman and Katharine G. Abraham, Measuring State and Local
8the reaction of corrections capital outlays to court orders. Data for state ¯nancial
variables are obtained from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State Government
Finances and Census of Governments. All ¯nancial variables are converted in real
(2007) dollars using the consumer price index.
We follow Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003) in using prison deaths as a proxy
for prison conditions. Courts have used prison deaths as a proxy for prison conditions
as recently as February 2009, when federal judges found prison conditions in California
so poor that inmates die regularly of suicides and lock of proper care (Thompson,
2009).11 The prison mortality rate is computed as prison deaths per 1,000 state
prisoners. Because of data limitations, the prison mortality is not adjusted for age,
gender, or race of prisoners. Data on prison population and prison deaths are obtained
from Donohue and Wolfers (2005), and updated using data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics.12
We also control for real income per capita, the proportion of female-headed house-
holds, the poverty rate, state unemployment rate, percentage of the state population
that is black, percentage of the state population residing in urban areas, and variables
gauging the age distribution in the state. Income per capita data are obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We followed Berry, Fording and Hanson (2003)
methodology to calculate the proportion of female-headed households in each state
until the year 2000. We used the poverty rate data reported by the same authors for
the period of 1960-1990 and the data provided by the census for the period 1980-2007
to create a consistent poverty rate series.13 The unemployment rate is de¯ned as
Government Labor Productivity: Examples from Eleven Services, U.S. Department of Labor, June
1998.)
11In response to these conditions the court ruled that California must release tens of thousand of
inmates to relive overcrowding.
12The data can be downloaded at http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/DeathPenalty.
shtml.
13Data source is ICPSR, study number 1294.
9the insured unemployment rate.14 State-and-year speci¯c age and race distribution is
calculated using information from the Center for Disease Control and the Bureau of
the Census. The proportion of state population residing in urban areas is calculated
using census data. Regressions also include a variable gauging the ideology of the
state's citizens, created by Berry et al. (1998).15 A higher value of this index signi¯es
more liberal ideology.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the years 1961 through 2000. The average
real spending is about $34,300 per prisoner for operating expenditures and $4,500 for
capital expenditures. Per capita state spending on welfare is $722. Average inmate-
population ratio is 1.78 per 1,000 residents, and average prison death rate is 2.9 deaths
per 1,000 inmates, which translates into 27 deaths per year for the average state. On
average there are 0.1 inmates per 1,000 residents who are held in local jails (rather
than state prisons) due to prison overcrowding.
4 Empirical methodology
In Figure 1 we display the ratio of corrections expenditures in litigated states to
corrections expenditures in non-litigated states. To account for di®erences in wealth
among states, expenditures are normalized by state income per capita, and they are
de°ated by the number of inmates and by the state population. The behavior of this
ratio as a function of the timing of the court order is informative. The horizontal
axis displays the time periods (in years) relative to the year in which the court order
was issued to the litigated state. For example, four years prior to the court order,
litigated states spent about 72% per inmate of what was spent by the non-litigated
14The data for the years 1960-2000 are obtained from Donohue and Wolfers (2005). The values
for 2001-2006 are calculated using state-speci¯c weekly unemployment insurance claims information
obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor.
15Updated values of the measure are available at (http://www.uky.edu/»rford/
Home ¯les/page0005.htm).
10states. When the time period is zero (the year in which the court order was issued)
the ratio jumps to about 87%; it reaches 102% two years after the court order and
levels o®. Thus, Figure 1 suggests that court intervention leads to higher corrections
expenditures per inmate.
Figure 1: Corrections Operating Expenditures in Litigated States as a Percentage
of Corrections Operating Expenditures in Non-Litigated States (all expenditures are



















−4 −2 0 2 4
Periods before and after the Court Order
Corr. Oper. Exp./Inmate Corr. Oper. Exp./Cap.
An ideal strategy to identify the impact of the court orders, however, would involve
randomly assigning court orders to states and observing the di®erences in outcomes
between states that received these court orders and states that did not. In fact, the
eight out of twelve litigated states are in the south and thus the assignment of court
orders is far from random. In the absence of such an experiment, we follow Angrist
11and Lavy (2001), Ashenfelter and Card (1985), and Freeman (1984) in assuming that
while there are di®erences between states which received and did not receive court
orders, these di®erences are ¯xed over time (after controlling for income per capita).
Furthermore, the courts do not react to short-term variations in prison conditions
when imposing the court orders. Speci¯cally, court orders are not issued in reaction
to transitory deteriorations in prison conditions; rather prison litigation and court
orders emerge in reaction to prison conditions that would remain dire if it were not
for court intervention. The graph in Figure 1 supports this statement. There is no
drop in per inmate corrections spending in litigated states relative to non-litigated
states before a court order was issued.16 Levitt (1996) provides evidence that states
start responding to prison litigation before the court decision, speci¯cally they start
responding when the lawsuit is ¯led. The evidence in Figure 1 is consistent with this
hypothesis, as corrections operating expenses per inmate increase slightly before the
court order is imposed. Thus the di®erence in corrections expenditures per inmate
before an after the court order may somewhat underestimate the e®ect of the court
intervention.17
In this spirit, we utilize a di®erence-in-di®erence methodology to examine how
states react to court intervention. In particular, we investigate the impact of court
intervention on various outcomes described earlier by estimating reduced-form regres-
sions depicted by Equation (1):
Yit = ®i + ¯it + µt + ±rp + °Xit + ´ CourtOrderit +± CourtOrderit £Post80 +"it; (1)
16Put di®erently, there is no indication of an \Ashenfelter dip."
17Note that corrections operating expenditures per capita in litigated states (the dashed line in
Figure 1) remain steady in comparison to non-litigated states until one year after the court order
(period 1 on the horizontal axis), while corrections operating expenditures per inmate rise sharply
in the year in which the court order is handed out (period zero on the horizontal axis). This picture
is consistent with the empirical result we report below, which shows that prisoners per capita in
the state declines in reaction to a court order. It seems to indicate that the immediate reaction of
the state to a court order is to adjust the prison population, while a budget increase in corrections
spending takes a year to implement, possibly because of the ¯scal cycle of the state.
12where the dependent variable Yit stands for corrections expenditures (operating, or
capital outlays) per prisoner, the death rate for prisoners, and prisoners per capita.
Because the prison death rate contains zero values, we added one to this variable.
These dependent variables are employed to investigate the impact of court orders
on corrections expenditures and prison conditions. To analyze the extent to which
states shift prisoners from state correctional facilities to local jails in reaction to
federal court orders, we employ per capita jail expenditures and per capita state pris-
oners held in local jails because of prison crowding as additional dependent variables.
Other dependent variables include per capita state general expenditures, per capita
welfare expenditures, per capita expenditures on corrections, per capita expenditures
on education, per capita transportation expenditures, and per capita expenditures
on other items (such as administrative expenditures). These individual expenditure
items comprise total state spending.
The vector Xit contains observable state characteristics as described in the data
section above; ®i stands for unobserved state characteristic and µt represents year
e®ects. The models also contain state-speci¯c time trends, represented by ¯it, and
region-period e®ects, represented by ±rp. The regions consist of the nine census divi-
sions, and the periods cover the four distinct periods described in Section 2 above:
before 1970, between 1970 and 1980, between 1980 and 1995, and post 1995. Nineteen-
seventy is the year of the ¯rst federal court order; 1980 is the year in which the justice
department changed its policy towards prison litigation (Schlanger, 2006); and 1995 is
the year in which Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act. We also include
an interaction term between the percentage of black population and the poverty rate.
\CourtOrderit" is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if state i is
under the court order in time t, and zero otherwise. \CourtOrder" can take the value
of one only in litigated states, but there is variation in exposure to the \treatment"
13by a court order between litigated states; that is, in some states the court order re-
mained e®ective for longer periods than others. For example, we see in Table 1 that
the duration of a court order was from 1975 to 1997 in Louisiana, but it was from
1970 to 1982 in Arkansas. We include an interaction term between CourtOrder and a
dummy variable which is equal to one in and after 1980 (Post80) to account for the po-
tentially di®erent impact of court orders after 1980. We expect Post80 £CourtOrder
to decrease corrections expenditures since it has been argued that court orders had
a smaller e®ect after the 1980s because of the narrowed scope of prison litigation in
the 1980s (Fliter, 1996; Schlanger, 2006). Because the percentage of female headed
households is available until 2000, Equation (1) is estimated for the years 1961-2000.
While the model depicted by Equation (1) analyzes the impact of a court order on
the outcomes of interest, another interesting aspect is the extent to which a release
from a court order in°uences the same outcomes. For example, while it is important
to investigate whether the imposition of a court order increases prison spending and
decreases spending on welfare programs, it is equally important to analyze if the e®ect
of a release from court order is symmetric. More speci¯cally, Equation (2) below is
used to investigate the impact of a release, conditional on being under a court order:
Yit = ·i + ¼it + ¿t + ±rp + ¸Xit + ¹Releaseit +!it; (2)
where Release is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of one in the year
during which the state was released from court order as well as in all years afterwards
until the end of the sample. Thus, the variable Release captures the \treatment
period" for the state, in which the \treatment" is the release from a court order. The
data on the proportion of female-headed households is available until 2000, but New
Hampshire and Texas were releases from court order in 2001 and 2002, respectively.
To include these events to the analysis we ran the models without female-headed
14household variable, which created a sample that spans from 1972 to 2006.
Equation (2) is estimated in the sample of litigated states and in the years following
the initiation of a court order. More precisely, this sample includes all state-years after
a state came under the court order.18 For example, Table 1 shows that Alabama came
under court order in 1975. Therefore, the sample includes the observations from
Alabama in years 1975 and later. The same argument applies to the other states
listed in Table 1. Thus, Equation (2) investigates whether the release from the court
order had an impact on outcomes (conditional on being under the court order).
5 Results
Table 3{A displays the results obtained by estimating Equation (1). The variables
are in logarithms. All models include state ¯xed-e®ects, time dummies, state-speci¯c
trends and region-period e®ects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state
level. The results reported in Column (1) indicate that, following the court interven-
tion, corrections operating expenditures per prisoner increase by about 25%.19 Col-
umn (2) displays the results obtained from the model where the dependent variable
is correctional capital outlays per prisoner. The estimated coe±cient of CourtOrder
indicates that being under the court order generates an increase in per inmate cor-
rectional capital outlays by 150% following the court intervention. These estimates
imply that corrections operating and capital expenditures go up by $147 million for
an average state. Court orders decrease the prison death rate by 20% as shown in col-
umn (3), which translates into about 6 fewer deaths per year for an average state. The
result in column (4) indicates that court orders generate a 16% decline in prisoners
per capita.
18This speci¯cation does not include an interaction term with Post80 because no state was released
from a court order prior to 1980.
19The percentage impact is calculated as expf¯ ¡ 1
2 £ V ar(¯)g ¡ 1, see Kennedy (1981).
15The coe±cient of CourtOrder£Post80 (±) is of the opposite sign of CourtOrder
(´) in all regressions with the exception of jail expenditures. We cannot reject the
hypothesis that the sum of ´ and ± is zero in case of corrections capital expenditures
and prison deaths. This result suggests that while court orders increased capital
expenditures and reduced prison deaths prior to 1980, court orders had no signi¯cant
impact on these outcomes after 1980. This ¯nding is consistent with the hypothesis
that post-1980, court orders had were narrowed in scope (Fliter, 1996; Schlanger,
2006). On the other hand, the sum of ´ and ± is negative and signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero for inmates per capita (p=0.08), indicating that court orders had a smaller
but still statistically signi¯cant impact on prison crowding after 1980. The impact of
the court orders on operating expenses (column 1) is the same in pre- and post-1980
periods, indicating that court orders increased corrections operating expenditures
throughout the entire period of analysis.
A potential reaction of states to court orders could be for states to shift the prison
population to local jails. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3{A display the results where
per capita jail expenditures and per capita state prisoners who are held in local jails
due to overcrowding are used as dependent variables. In neither case we detect a
statistically signi¯cant impact of the \CourtOrder," indicating that jail populations
do not change in reaction to court orders.
Given that court orders decrease prison population and improve prison conditions,
as revealed by a decline in prison deaths and prison population, court orders e®ectively
reduce deterrence.20 As described in the introduction, welfare spending may be a tool
for short-term crime prevention as a substitute for other deterrence measures such as
imprisonment and prison conditions. Spending on education is another potential but
20In fact, Levitt (1996) has shown that the decrease in prison population due to court orders had
a signi¯cant impact on state crime rates.
16longer-term vehicle through which crime commission can be in°uenced. Therefore, we
examine whether the increase in the cost of punishing criminals was associated with
an increase in welfare spending or education spending. More generally, we investigate
whether states re-allocate resources following the court orders.
Table 3{B displays the result of the models where per capita state expenditures
(in column 1) and various spending categories of the state (columns 2{6) are the
dependent variables. These spending categories exhaust total state expenditures. 21
Column (1) of Table 3{B indicates that court orders have no impact on per capita
general state spending. Consistent with the results reported in Table 3{A, column (2)
shows that court orders increase per capita correctional spending by 14 %. In column
(3) the coe±cient of CourtOrder is negative and statistically signi¯cant, indicating the
unintended consequence of reducing welfare spending: court orders generate about a
8% reduction in per capita welfare spending. Columns (4) through (6) demonstrate
that court orders have no impact on transportation spending, education spending, or
other state spending.
Taken together, the results displayed in Tables 3{A and 3{B demonstrate that
court orders improved prison conditions, and they increased the cost of providing
correctional services. In reaction, states decreased the resources allocated to welfare
spending. During our period of study (1961 through 2000), there were numerous
changes in the federal rules that determine welfare. Thus, we may be concerned
that our results are driven by correlation between prison litigation and changes in
federal welfare rules. This scenario is unlikely since we provide evidence that in
response to court intervention, states did not increase total expenditures and they
did not decrease expenditures in any other category other than welfare. Nonetheless,
21Average per capita state general expenditures is $2,760. Average per capita state spending on
education is $1,023. It is $722 for welfare, $395 for transportation, $134 for correctional spending
and $558 for other items, such as administration.
17to investigate if the impact of court orders on state welfare spending is sensitive to
model speci¯cation, we estimate a variety of models for welfare spending and report
the results in Table 3{C. For example, the speci¯cation in the ¯rst column of Table
3{C is the same speci¯cation reported in column (3) of Table 3{B, but we drop the
interaction term of the CourtOrder and the Post-1980 dummy. The model in column
(2) is the same as in column (1), but we exclude the region-period interactions. The
point estimates in Table 3{C vary from -0.06 to -0.09, but in each speci¯cation the
impact of CourtOrder on welfare spending is negative and statistically signi¯cant,
demonstrating that court orders prompted the states to reduce their spending on
welfare.
As a further check of the validity of the identi¯cation strategy, we investigate
the impact of exposure to court orders on the di®erent facets of the criminal justice
system; police spending and jail spending. Speci¯cally, we examine the impact of
court orders on the di®erence between state correctional operating expenditures per
prison inmate and (i) police expenditures per arrest, and (ii) jail expenditures per
jail inmate. If corrections expenditures and other criminal justice expenditures move
in tandem in states that are exposed to court orders as well as in states that are not
under the court order, this would imply that some unobserved factors confound the
impact of court orders on corrections spending. Put di®erently, if federal intervention
has an e®ect, the di®erence between corrections expenditures and other criminal
justice expenditures are expected to get larger in states that are exposed to court
orders. Thus, the di®erence-in-di®erence-in-di®erences estimates allow us to control
for unobserved factors that are not accounted for by state ¯xed e®ects, year ¯xed
e®ects, state speci¯c time trends and region-period e®ects.
Table 4 displays the results of the model where the dependent variable is the di®er-
ence between per inmate corrections spending and other correctional expenditures (in
18logs, normalized by inmates, arrests, or population). The coe±cient of CourtOrder
is positive and statistically signi¯cant, indicating that the wedge between corrections
operating expenditures and other correctional expenditures increased in states that
were exposed to court orders in comparison to those states that were not.
To investigate the impact of having been released from a court order, we estimated
models depicted by Equation (2). Tables 5{A and 5{B display the results. The sample
sizes are smaller in these speci¯cations because they analyze the impact of having been
released from the court order, given that a court order was imposed. Because we have
only 12 states that contribute to this identi¯cation, clustered robust standard errors
underestimate standard errors. Thus, we follow Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008)
and provide bootstrapped p-values for the variable Release [in brackets]. Regardless
of whether we compute p-value using limiting p{values or bootstrap, welfare spending
does not increase when states are released from court order. Thus, the budget cuts
that are associated with welfare programs following the court order are not restored
after the state's release from court order. Similarly, states do not alter per inmate
corrections spending when the court order is lifted, and prison deaths per inmate and
inmates per capita do not change when states are released from the court order.
To investigate the robustness of the results, we analyzed whether the results were
sensitive to the omission of Alaska and Hawaii. Alaska receives its tax revenues
from oil, which is a highly variable revenue source. Hawaii is also unusual as a large
percentage of its revenues comes from tourism. However, omitting these states did not
alter the results. We estimated the prison death equation using the level of (deaths
per 1,000 inmates) as the dependent variable, rather than its logarithm. About four
percent of the sample contained zeros for this variable. Estimating the prison death
rate regression in levels did not alter the results. The coe±cient of CourtOrder was
estimated as ¡0.83 (p=0.028), indicating a reduction of about 8 deaths for an average
19state, which is similar to the results obtained from the model with logarithms.
6 Conclusion
Although it is believed that the intervention of federal courts has improved the con-
ditions in state prisons, very little systematic analysis is available on the impact of
court orders. The extent to which the federal court order are enforceable is disputed
(Fliter, 1996; Taggart, 1989; Harriman and Straussman 1983). Even if the court or-
ders are fully enforceable, the response of states having to spend additional resources
on prisons depends on numerous factors such as the level of heterogeneity in the
population, the shape of the utility function of the median voter (Baicker, 2001), the
deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies (Becker and Mulligan, 2001), and the cost
of altering the provision of various government services. Therefore, theoretically, the
impact of federal court orders on prison spending and prison conditions is ambiguous.
Furthermore, there exists no research that investigates the reaction of states to federal
court orders in such dimensions as education spending and welfare expenditures.
In this paper we employ a state-level panel data set to investigate states' reactions
to federal court interventions. Speci¯cally, we analyze the impact of court orders on
prison spending, prison conditions, per capita prisoners, as well as state spending
on welfare, education, transportation, and other state spending. We ¯nd that court
intervention in state prisons increased per inmate operating expenditures by about
25%, increased per capita corrections capital expenditures by 150%, decreased pris-
oners per capita by 16 percent and prison mortality by 6 prisoner deaths per year for
an average state.
We also investigate the e®ect of the release from a court order, and we ¯nd no
evidence that when the court orders are lifted states adjust back their corrections
expenditures. Similarly, prison mortality rate does not change following the release
20of the court order.
Because court orders make it more expensive for states to deter crime through
imprisonment, one could expect states to shift towards relatively cheaper means of
deterring crime. For example, given that spending on education and welfare programs
are expected to negatively impact criminal activity, states could spend more on these
budget items following the imposition of court orders. However, we ¯nd that follow-
ing court orders, state expenditures on education, transportation, and other items
remained the same, but expenditures on welfare decreased by about 8%. In addition,
our results indicate that after the state has been released from court order, welfare
spending is not restored. The results follow from a di®erence-in-di®erences method-
ology. Thus, they denote changes that arise because of the exposure to a court order
relative to a group of comparison states. For instance, welfare expenditures may have
increased in all states, but the increase was smaller in states that were subject to
court order.
One explanation of these ¯nding is that increases in expenditures in those pro-
grams that a®ect the poor trigger a decrease in expenditures in other programs that
also a®ect the poor. For instance, if state legislators believe that welfare recipients
and criminals come from the same social groups, then cutting welfare spending may
be considered a substitute to imprisonment in punishing criminals by the legislators.
Another explanation is that spending on expenditure categories is \sticky." Hystere-
sis in welfare spending can emerge because the average duration of a court order is 18
years, and the governors and state legislators change during this period. Thus, it is
conceivable state legislators who are in o±ce when the state is released from the court
order are not concerned with a budget re-allocation that took place years ago, long
before they were elected to o±ce. Regardless of the mechanism that generates this
outcome, the ¯ndings underscore that states shift the burden of increased correctional
21spending on the poor.
22References
Joshua D. Angrist and Victor Lavy. Does teacher training a®ect pupil learning?
Evidence from matched comparisons in Jerusalem Public Schools. Journal of Labor
Economics, 19(2):343{369, 2001.
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card. Using the longitudinal structure of earnings to
estimate the e®ect of training programs. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
67(4):648{660, 1985.
Katherine Baicker. Government decision-making and the incidence of federal man-
dates. Journal of Public Economics, 82(2):147{194, November 2001.
Katherine Baicker and Nora Gordon. The e®ect of state education ¯nance reform on
total local resources. Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9):1519{1535, September
2006.
Gary S. Becker and Casey B. Mulligan. Deadweight costs and the size of government.
Journal of Law and Economics, 46(2):293{340, October 2003.
William D. Berry, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson.
Measuring citizen and government ideology in the american states, 1960-93. Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science, 42(1):327{348, January 1998.
Je® Bleich. The politics of prison crowding. California Law Review, 77(5):1125{1180,
1989.
Cameron, C., J. Gelbach and D. Miller. Bootstrap-based Improvements for Inference
With Clustered Errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3):414{427,
August 2008.
23Hope Corman and H. Naci Mocan. A time-series analysis of crime and drug use in
New York City. American Economic Review, 90(3):584{604, June 2000.
Hope Corman and H. Naci Mocan. Carrots, sticks and broken windows. Journal of
Law and Economics, 48(1):235{66, April 2005.
John J. Donohue and Peter Siegelman. Allocating resources among prisons and social
programs in the battle against crime. Journal of Legal Studies, 27(1):1{43, January
1998.
John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers. Uses and abuses of empirical evidence in the
death penalty debate. Stanford Law Review, 58:791{846, 2005.
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Je®rey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland. The judical
common space. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 23(2):303{325, 2007.
John Fliter. Another look at the judicial power of the purse: Courts, corrections, and
state budgets in the 1980s. Law & Society Review, 30(2):399{416, 1996.
Richard Freeman. Longitudinal analyses of the e®ects of trade Unions. Journal of
Labor Economics, 2(1):1{26, 1984.
Eric D. Gould, David B. Mustard, and Bruce A. Weinberg. Crime rates and local
labor market opportunities in the United States: 1977-1997. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 84(1):45{61, 2002.
Linda Harriman and Je®rey D. Straussman. Do judges determine budget decisions?
Federal court decisions in prison reform and state spending for corrections. Public
Administration Review, 43(4):343{351, July{August 1983.
James M. Hirschhorn. Where the money is: Remedies to ¯nance compliance with
structural injunctions. Michigan Law Review, 82:1815{1877, August 1984.
24Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt, and Ellen Shustorovich. Prison conditions, capital
punishment, and deterrence. American Law and Economics Review, 5(2):318{343,
August 2003.
Peter E. Kennedy. Estimation with correctly interpreted dummy variables in semilog-
arithmic equations. American Economic Review, 71(4):801, September 1981.
Steven D Levitt. The e®ect of prison population size on crime rates: Evidence from
prison overcrowding litigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2):319{
51, May 1996.
Ming-Jen Lin. Does unemployment increase crime? Evidence from U.S. data 1974-
2000. Journal of Human Resources, 43(2):413{36, 2008.
Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti. The e®ect of education on crime: Evidence from
prison inmates, arrests, and self-reports. American Economic Review, 94(1):155{
189, March 2004.
H. Naci Mocan and Turan Bali. Asymmetric crime cycles. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, Forthcoming.
Solomon Moore. California prisons must cut inmate population. New York Times,
August 4, 2009.
Murray, Sheila, William N. Evans and Robert M. Schwab. Education-Finance Reform
and the Distribution of Education Resources. The American Economic Review,
88(4), pp.789-812.
Susan Rose-Ackerman. Book reviw. Political Science Quarterly, 118(4):679{681,
Winter 2003.
25Albert J. Rosenthal. Conditional federal spending and the constitution. Stanford Law
Review, 39:1103{1161, May 1987.
Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod. The supreme court, democracy and institutional
reform litigation. NYU Law Review, 49(3):915{942, 2004.
Susan Rose-Ackerman. Book reviw. Political Science Quarterly, 118(4):679{681,
Winter 2003.
Albert J. Rosenthal. Conditional federal spending and the constitution. Stanford Law
Review, 39:1103{1161, May 1987.
Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod. The supreme court, democracy and institutional
reform litigation. NYU Law Review, 49(3):915{942, 2004.
Margo Schlanger. Civil rights injunctions over time: A case study of jail and prison
court orders. New York University Law Review, 81, 2006.
Margo Schlanger. Beyond the hero judge: Institutional reform litigation as litigation.
Michigan Law Review, 97:1994{2036, May 1999.
John Sullivan. States and cities removing prisons from courts' grip. New York Times,
January 30, 2000.
William A. Taggart. Rede¯ning the power the federal judiciary: The impact of court-
orderd prison reform on state expenditures for corrections. Law & Society Review,
23(2):241{271, 1989.
Don Thompson. Judges tentatively order Calif. inmates released. Seattle Times,
February 9, 2009.
Joseph Wharton. Courts now out of job as jailers. ABA Journal, 82(8):49, August
1996.
26Table 1: States Subject to Federal Court Intervention { \Litigated States"
State Case Citation Year of Year of
Court Decision Release
AL Pugh v. Locke Injunction (M.D. Ala.) 1975 1989
AR Holt v. Server 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark) 1970 1982
FL Costello v. Wainwright 489 F.Supp. 1100 (M.D. Fl.) 1980 1993
LA Williams v. Edwards Injunction (M.D. La.) 1975 1997
MS Gates v. Collier 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss.) 1972 1998
NM Duran v. Apodaca Consent decree (D. N.M.) 1980 1998
NH Laaman v. Helgemoe 437 F.Supp. 269 (D.N.H.) 1977 2001
OK Battle v. Anderson 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Ok.) 1974 1986
RI Palmigiano v. Garrahy 443 F. Supp. 956 (D. R.I.) 1977 1995
SC Nelson v. Leeke Consent decree (D. S.C.) 1985 1996
TN Grubbs v. Bradley 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn.) 1982 1996
TX Ruiz v. Estelle 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex.) 1980 2002
27Table 2: Summary Statistics (years 1961{2000)
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corr. Oper. Exp./Inm. 1889 $34,302 $16,401 $3,910 $122,671
Corr. Capit. Exp./Inm. 1889 $4,512 $5,903 $0 $77,285
Death per Inmate (£ 1000) 1842 2.89 1.89 0.00 25.06
Inmates per Cap. (£ 1000) 1889 1.78 1.33 0.20 8.91
Jail Exp. Per Cap. 1316 $28.67 $25.86 $0.00 $153.01
Jail Overcrowd./Cap. (£ 1000) 1736 0.11 0.33 0.00 3.88
State General Exp./Cap. 1940 $2,763 $1,185 $625 $12,243
State Welfare Exp./Cap. 1940 $722 $400 $136 $2,516
State Corrections Exp./Cap. 1940 $66 $ 51 $6 $351
State Transp. Exp./Cap. 1940 $394 $172 $139 $1,669
State Education Exp./Cap. 1940 $1,023 $ 394 $149 $3,064
State Other Exp./Cap. 1940 $558 $447 $56 $5,443
Court Order 1940 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Poverty Rate 1940 14.39 5.38 4.34 50.91
Female Head. HH. 1940 2.17 0.96 0.61 6.84
Ideology 1940 45.87 16.34 0.96 93.91
Income per Capita 1940 $24,776 $6,320 $9,098 $ 49,959
Unemployment Rate 1940 2.91 1.45 0.50 9.70
% Black 1940 9.50 9.39 0.14 41.50
% Urban 1940 67.76 14.96 25.68 100.00
% Population 0-14 1940 24.93 3.99 17.94 37.42
% Population 15-24 1940 16.40 2.16 9.64 21.39
% Population 25-44 1940 27.72 3.65 16.26 38.37
% Population 45-54 1940 10.93 1.90 7.40 40.62
% Population 55+ 1940 20.03 2.68 9.71 28.78
28Table 3-A: Impact of Federal Court Orders on Corrections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corrections Corrections Jail
Oper. Exp. Capital Exp. Deaths Inmates Jail Overcrowd.
per Inm. per Inm. per Inm. per Cap. Exp./Cap. per Cap.
Court Order 0.226*** 0.939*** -0.217* -0.174*** 0.0284 -0.186
(0.0549) (0.219) (0.116) (0.0487) (0.104) (0.521)
Court Order £ Post80 -0.0924 -0.861*** 0.198 0.112** 0.0203 0.109
(0.0599) (0.297) (0.159) (0.0537) (0.115) (0.539)
Poverty Rate 0.0535 -0.393 -0.0276 -0.345* 0.537 0.828
(0.206) (0.685) (0.306) (0.173) (0.388) (2.292)
Fem. Head. HH. 0.0614 -1.754* -1.034*** -0.339 0.0129 1.321
(0.201) (0.993) (0.327) (0.218) (0.410) (2.794)
Pov. Rate £ % Black -0.0152 -0.0180 0.0599 -0.0863*** 0.0987 -0.003
(0.0343) (0.130) (0.0504) (0.0309) (0.105) (0.480)
Ideology 0.0355 -0.337** -0.0225 0.0494 -0.0820 0.599
(0.0468) (0.142) (0.0918) (0.0344) (0.0683) (0.387)
Income/Capita 0.754** 3.257** -0.885 -0.490* 1.161 0.962
(0.369) (1.219) (0.686) (0.286) (0.770) (3.226)
Unemp. Rate 0.0870* 0.179 -0.0630 0.0457 0.137 -0.353
(0.0502) (0.191) (0.0741) (0.0443) (0.0831) (0.330)
% Black 0.0843 -0.563 -0.452 -0.0838 0.0140 0.760
(0.154) (0.940) (0.393) (0.174) (0.356) (2.197)
% Urban -0.293 0.946 -0.341 0.678* 0.252 9.253
(0.277) (1.633) (0.512) (0.363) (1.178) (6.898)
% Population 15-24 0.409 0.650 0.964 0.242 0.290 2.157
(0.314) (1.661) (0.592) (0.223) (0.949) (3.220)
% Population 25-44 0.548 -5.758 2.330** 0.204 3.111** -3.299
(0.822) (3.617) (1.080) (0.912) (1.294) (8.251)
% Population 45-54 -0.0633 -1.366 0.761 0.508 0.924 0.484
(0.335) (1.425) (0.607) (0.348) (0.661) (5.392)
% Population 55+ -0.550 -2.299 0.466 0.496 0.838 2.359
(0.530) (2.443) (0.699) (0.429) (1.675) (7.215)
Observations 1889 1885 1842 1889 1239 1436
R-squared 0.933 0.372 0.335 0.971 0.948 0.775
Notes { The dependent variables are the corrections operating expenditures per inmate,
corrections operating expenditures per 1,000 residents, corrections capital expenditures per capita,
prison deaths per 1,000 inmates and prisoners per 1,000 residents. All variables are in logarithms.
All models contain state ¯xed e®ects, year dummies and state trends as well as region-period
e®ects. Regions correspond to nine census regions. Periods are pre-1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1995 and
post-1995. ***, ** and * indicate signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
29Table 3-B: Impact of Federal Court orders on the State Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Corrections Welfare Trans. Educ. Other
Exp./Cap. Exp./Cap Exp./Cap Exp./Cap. Exp./Cap. Exp./Cap.
Court Order -0.0347 0.133** -0.0792* 0.00591 -0.0289 -0.0372
(0.0218) (0.0547) (0.0423) (0.0615) (0.0232) (0.0358)
Court Order £ Post80 0.0239 -0.0721 0.0333 -0.0634 0.0352 0.0513
(0.0305) (0.0674) (0.0446) (0.0660) (0.0307) (0.0496)
Poverty Rate -0.104* -0.0658 -0.0682 -0.276** -0.166* 0.115
(0.0605) (0.220) (0.112) (0.117) (0.0871) (0.0895)
Fem. Head. HH. 0.258** -0.554*** 0.674*** -0.0838 0.146 0.253
(0.123) (0.191) (0.200) (0.206) (0.162) (0.173)
Pov. Rate £ % Black -0.0384** -0.0586 -0.0440 -0.0657*** 0.000281 -0.0108
(0.0178) (0.0468) (0.0288) (0.0237) (0.0219) (0.0277)
Ideology 0.00369 0.0211 0.0120 -0.00283 0.0201 -0.00744
(0.0119) (0.0358) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0155) (0.0174)
Income/Capita 0.291** 0.620* 0.175 0.747** 0.144 0.320
(0.139) (0.314) (0.246) (0.298) (0.191) (0.259)
Unemp. Rate 0.0683*** 0.142*** 0.0726*** 0.114*** 0.0573* 0.0539*
(0.0155) (0.0447) (0.0238) (0.0317) (0.0290) (0.0271)
% Black 0.100 -0.306 0.398** 0.0996 -0.190 -0.0953
(0.0936) (0.236) (0.169) (0.132) (0.137) (0.163)
% Urban 0.000875 0.346 -0.337 0.420 0.0137 0.112
(0.343) (0.662) (0.259) (0.469) (0.353) (0.547)
% Population 15-24 0.224 0.792** 0.234 0.446 0.0490 0.0792
(0.159) (0.336) (0.211) (0.282) (0.227) (0.217)
% Population 25-44 -0.379 0.616 -0.648 1.163* -1.431** -0.292
(0.404) (0.893) (0.751) (0.585) (0.580) (0.549)
% Population 45-54 -0.545*** 0.543* -0.434 -0.362* -0.678*** -0.862***
(0.135) (0.300) (0.277) (0.202) (0.191) (0.249)
% Population 55+ -0.0664 -0.318 -0.285 0.181 -0.262 -0.660
(0.233) (0.493) (0.382) (0.344) (0.312) (0.441)
Observations 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940
R-squared 0.978 0.957 0.973 0.869 0.963 0.970
Notes { The dependent variables are the total and state ¯nanced welfare expenditures per 1,000
residents, education expenditures per 1,000 residents, state and local police expenditures per 1,000
residents, and local correctional expenditures per 1,000 residents. All variables are in logarithms.
All models contain state ¯xed e®ects, year dummies and state trends as well as region-period
e®ects. Regions correspond to nine census regions. Periods are pre-1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1995 and
post-1995. ***, ** and * indicate signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
30Table 3-C: Impact of Federal Court Orders on per Capita Welfare Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Court Order -0.0557** -0.0597** -0.0861* -0.0669** -0.0614** -0.0862***
(0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0468) (0.0285) (0.0251) (0.0307)
Court Order £ Post80 0.0346
(0.0510)
Poverty Rate -0.0657 -0.0656 0.0195
(0.112) (0.117) (0.0903)
Fem. Head. HH. 0.686*** 0.695*** 0.813***
(0.201) (0.203) (0.194)
Pov. Rate £ % Black -0.0415 -0.0410 -0.00398
(0.0292) (0.0286) (0.0208)
Ideology 0.0120 0.00975 0.0144
(0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0200)
Income/Capita 0.176 0.136 -0.263 -0.306
(0.246) (0.244) (0.217) (0.218)
Unemp. Rate 0.0744*** 0.0767*** 0.0727*** 0.0759***
(0.0235) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0252)
% Black 0.390** 0.393** 0.315* 0.321*
(0.170) (0.171) (0.173) (0.174)
% Urban -0.338 -0.335 -0.477* -0.489*
(0.261) (0.263) (0.249) (0.254)
% Population 15-24 0.243 0.256 0.268 0.305 0.169
(0.209) (0.205) (0.226) (0.224) (0.214)
% Population 25-44 -0.641 -0.665 -0.720 -0.720 -0.881
(0.750) (0.754) (0.729) (0.734) (0.731)
% Population 45-54 -0.431 -0.440 -0.260 -0.258 -0.468*
(0.275) (0.283) (0.294) (0.300) (0.269)
% Population 55+ -0.282 -0.272 -0.215 -0.205 -0.431
(0.380) (0.375) (0.387) (0.378) (0.346)
Observations 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940
R-squared 0.973 0.972 0.971 0.970 0.971 0.967
State Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-period Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Notes { The dependent variables are the corrections operating expenditures per inmate,
corrections operating expenditures per 1,000 residents, corrections capital expenditures per capita,
prison deaths per 1,000 inmates and prisoners per 1,000 residents. All variables are in logarithms.
All models contain state ¯xed e®ects, year dummies and state trends as well as region-period
e®ects. Regions correspond to nine census regions. Periods are pre-1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1995 and
post-1995. ***, ** and * indicate signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
31Table 4: Impact of Federal Court Orders on the Di®erence Between Corrections
Operating Expenditures and Spending on Police and Jails
(1) (2)
Corr. Oper-Police Correct Oper. -Jails
Court Order 0.416*** 0.262***
(0.155) (0.072)
Court Order £ Post80 -0.271** -0.224**
(0.133) (0.100)
Poverty Rate 0.390 -0.277
(0.399) (0.296)
Fem. Head. HH. -0.421 -0.523**
(0.279) (0.206)






Unem. Rate -0.078 -0.158**
(0.088) (0.068)
% Black -0.362 0.571
(0.766) (0.399)
% Urban -1.955* -0.632
(1.035) (0.820)
% Population 15-24 0.590 0.257
(0.538) (0.506)
% Population 25-44 2.769 -2.833***
(2.316) (0.975)
% Population 45-54 1.206 -0.568
(1.264) (0.588)




Notes { Corrections Operating Expenditures, Police Expenditures and JailExpenditures are
normalized by the number of inmates in prison, number of arrests and the number of inmates in
jail, respectively. All variables are in logarithms. All models contain state ¯xed e®ects, year
dummies and state trends as well as region-period e®ects. Regions correspond to nine census
regions. Periods are pre-1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1995 and post-1995. ***, ** and * indicate
signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
32Table 5-A: Impact of Releases from Federal Court Orders on Corrections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corrections Corrections Jail
Oper. Exp. Capital Exp. Deaths Inmates Jail Overcrowd.
per Inm. per Inm. per Inm. per Cap. Exp./Cap. per Cap.
Release -0.137 -0.285 0.166 0.0510 0.0191 -0.101
(0.0462) (0.275) (0.0984) (0.0390) (0.0851) (0.582)
[0.716] [0.794] [0.857] [0.918] [0.986] [0.960]
Poverty Rate -0.368 -2.005 -0.655 0.242 -0.776 1.569
(0.305) (3.449) (1.250) (0.308) (0.715) (5.539)
Pov. Rate £ % Black -0.116 -0.256 -0.00995 0.0960 -0.0671 -0.268
(0.100) (0.768) (0.469) (0.0702) (0.182) (1.141)
Ideology 0.0452 -0.564 -0.173 -0.0191 -0.135 -0.313
(0.102) (0.503) (0.206) (0.0679) (0.191) (0.619)
Income/Capita 1.179 0.901 0.241 -0.0678 1.699 -5.024
(0.914) (3.897) (1.293) (0.654) (0.986) (6.051)
Unemp. Rate 0.141 0.145 0.345 0.0133 0.356 -0.903
(0.0340) (0.431) (0.154) (0.0369) (0.105) (0.659)
% Black 0.785 1.861 1.464 -0.568 1.300 -2.867
(0.335) (2.340) (1.161) (0.223) (0.785) (4.877)
% Urban -1.325 1.915 4.130 1.240 3.551 -13.612
(1.209) (4.468) (2.729) (0.693) (1.921) (11.780)
% Population 15-24 -1.296 0.489 2.676 -0.0918 -2.685 10.18
(0.506) (3.604) (1.439) (0.401) (1.653) (8.034)
% Population 25-44 -1.571 -5.589 4.259 0.717 2.631 14.29
(1.544) (9.162) (2.966) (0.827) (2.961) (23.76)
% Population 45-54 0.440 0.539 0.111 -0.280 1.495 9.688
(1.285) (6.981) (1.419) (0.920) (2.495) (9.733)
% Population 55+ 1.247 -3.755 0.140 -0.685 -0.452 0.201
(1.706) (6.704) (2.035) (1.427) (2.826) (18.18)
Observations 355 355 355 355 290 347
R-squared 0.945 0.592 0.434 0.984 0.935 0.873
Notes { The dependent variables are the corrections operating expenditures per inmate,
corrections operating expenditures per 1,000 residents, corrections capital expenditures per capita,
prison deaths per 1,000 inmates and prisoners per 1,000 residents. All variables are in logarithms.
All models contain state ¯xed e®ects, year dummies and state trends as well as region-period
e®ects. Regions correspond to nine census regions. Periods are pre-1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1995 and
post-1995. The values in [brackets] are the p-values of the estimated coe±cients of Release based
on bootstrapping proposed by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). ***, ** and * indicate
signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
33Table 5-B: Impact of Releases from Federal Court Orders on State Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Corrections Welfare Trans. Educ. Other
Exp./Cap. Exp./Cap Exp./Cap Exp./Cap. Exp./Cap. Exp./Cap.
Release -0.0317 -0.0817 0.00584 -0.0209 -0.0598 -0.0540
(0.0178) (0.0685) (0.0383) (0.0540) (0.0136) (0.0380)
[0.802] [0.789] [0.990] [0.938] [0.324] [0.780]
Poverty Rate -0.125 -0.0565 -0.219 -0.165 -0.0651 0.140
(0.147) (0.449) (0.375) (0.573) (0.104) (0.280)
Pov. Rate £ % Black -0.0841 0.0423 -0.112 -0.109 -0.0346 -0.0512
(0.0540) (0.108) (0.105) (0.122) (0.0265) (0.101)
Ideology 0.0215 -0.0393 0.0698 -0.0452 0.0228 -0.0229
(0.0361) (0.0996) (0.0603) (0.0789) (0.0213) (0.0640)
Income/Capita 0.987 1.167 0.858 1.484 0.960 1.359
(0.202) (0.637) (0.400) (0.434) (0.260) (0.450)
Unemp. Rate 0.0339 0.194 -0.0268 0.0681 0.0588 0.123
(0.0261) (0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0873) (0.0173) (0.0525)
% Black 0.165 0.202 0.235 0.0338 0.166 -0.00890
(0.200) (0.414) (0.272) (0.256) (0.145) (0.436)
% Urban -0.670 0.810 0.239 -2.264 -2.134 0.662
(0.398) (0.995) (0.574) (0.946) (0.344) (0.855)
% Population 15-24 -0.717 -0.682 -0.569 -1.029* -1.061 -0.211
(0.366) (0.640) (0.725) (0.498) (0.279) (0.484)
% Population 25-44 -0.858 -1.160 -1.504 -0.395 -1.350* 0.457
(0.499) (1.486) (1.195) (1.793) (0.643) (1.087)
% Population 45-54 -0.755 -0.165 -0.427 -1.968 -0.243 -1.251
(0.371) (1.122) (0.622) (0.856) (0.331) (0.714)
% Population 55+ 0.613 0.0160 -2.057 3.218 2.651 1.563
(0.270) (1.024) (0.838) (1.619) (0.396) (0.955)
Observations 357 357 357 357 357 357
R-squared 0.983 0.956 0.971 0.800 0.984 0.967
Notes { The dependent variables are the total and state ¯nanced welfare expenditures per 1,000
residents, education expenditures per 1,000 residents, state and local police expenditures per 1,000
residents, and local correctional expenditures per 1,000 residents. All variables are in logarithms.
All models contain state ¯xed e®ects, year dummies and state trends as well as region-period
e®ects. Regions correspond to nine census regions. Periods are pre-1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1995 and
post-1995. The values in [brackets] are the p-values of the estimated coe±cients of Release based
on bootstrapping proposed by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). ***, ** and * indicate
signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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